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This paper addressesthe use of Steganography over the Internet by terrorists. There were ru-
mors in the newspapers that Steganography is being used to covert communication between 
terrorists, without presenting any scientific proof. Niels Provos and Peter Honeyman con-
ducted an extensive Internet search where they analyzed over 2 million images and didn’t find 
a single hidden image. After this study the scientific community was divided: some believed 
that Niels Provos and Peter Honeyman was conclusive enough other did not. 
This paper describes what Steganography is and what can be used for, various Steganogra-
phy techniques and also presents the studies made regarding the use of Steganography on the 
Internet. 
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Introduction 
Steganography is the art of secret com-
munication. The difference between Stega-
nography and Cryptography is that the latter 
will make the message unreadable, but the 
existence of secret communication will be 
there. Steganography on the other part hides 
the message and “erases” the existence of 
any communication. In modern times Stega-
nography and cryptography are complemen-
tary: first the message is encrypted and then 
is hidden using Steganography. 
On February 2000, USA Today reported that 
terrorists are using Steganography to post se-
cret communication on the Internet [1]. The 
newspaper article didn’t contain any scientif-
ic proof  or technical information that will 
permit the reader to verify the claims. Other 
news agencies reported that images posted on 
eBay and Amazon contained hidden messag-
es [2].In their paper Niels Provos and Peter 
Honeyman [3] tried to verify the claims by 
analysing  over two milion images 
downloaded from eBay and one milion 
images  downloaded form USENET arhives 
and they  didn’t discover a single hidden 
message. For image analysis they  used a 
open source framework  created by them. 
Recent studies show that the proposed 
framewok can’t detect all hidden messages in 
images. This paper will examine the research 
done in this area. 
 
2 Steganography 
Steganography derives from the Greek word 
“steganos”, meaning secret and “graphy” 
meaning writing. Steganography represents a 
hidden writing. The message is visible, but 
remains undetected because we are not aware 
of its existence. A usual description of Ste-
ganography is “Hiding in plain sight”. 
Sometimes encrypted messages have been in-
tercepted but never decrypted. Even so the 
damage was done, because the existence of 
an encrypted message shows that someone is 
communicating confidential information. 
This is the reason nowadays Steganography 
is used combined  with cryptography. This 
way the existence of a secret communication 
is erased. 
The basic structure of Steganography is made 
up of three components: the“carrier”, the 
message, and the key [4]. The carrier  (or 
cover) can be a digital image, an audio file, 
even a protocol (like TCP/IP packet).  The 
cover will conceal the hidden message.  
When a Steganography algorithm is eva-
luated the following are taken into considera-
tion: 
-  Capacity  –  the amount of information 
that can be hidden without altering the 
cover medium in such way that will at-
tract suspicion 
-  Security – the difficulty of detecting the 
hidden information. Usually security re-
lates with capacity – if we hide a large 
1 154    Informatica Economică vol. 15, no. 2/2011 
 
amount of information in a cover me-
dium it will be easier to detect. 
-  Robustness – the amount of modifica-
tion that the cover medium can endure 
before the hidden information will be 
destroyed. 
How Steganography can be used [5] for: 
-  Enhanced Data Structures: hide extra in-
formation with the standard medium 
such as hiding information about a photo 
(like the year and place it was taken) in 
the photo itself, this way the information 
will “travel” along with the photo.  
-  Strong watermarks: used mostly for cop-
yright of digital content such as books, 
movies and audio files. Some water-
marks are meant to be visible such as a 
word in the background of a document 
and others are not. The invisible water-
marks are used for identification purpos-
es mostly to know how originated the 
document, who bought that file and dis-
tributed illegally. Watermarking tech-
nology has been embedded into DVDs 
and DVDs/CDs, nowadays if a DVD/CD 
bears a DO NOT COPY watermark, 
some DVD/CD writers might refuse to 
create a copy. 
-  Document-Tracking tools –the hidden 
information inside of a document can 
identify the legitimate owner of the doc-
ument or the person the document was 
issued to - this type of identification is 
used mostly in digital libraries who gen-
erate a watermark barring the users id, if 
the file is posted over the Internet it can 
be tracked to the person who illegally 
published it.  
-  File Authentication –the hidden informa-
tion embedded into a file can certify file 
authenticity. 
-  Private Communications –  Steganogra-
phy can be used for private communica-
tions by embedded information into a 
harmless cover. 
There is a difference between Steganography 
and watermarking, in Steganography the 
message is important, any alteration to the 
message will make it unreadable. In water-
marking it is important that at least one wa-
termark is preserved during and attack, it 
doesn’t matter if the other marks are de-
stroyed.  
 
3 Different kinds of Steganography 
There are different kinds of Steganography 
which are going to be briefly described for 
information purposes. Due to the papers top-
ic, the emphasis will be on Steganography in 
images and in protocols (on web); the other 
domains will be briefly mentioned. 
-  Steganography in Images 
Images are the most popular carriers for Ste-
ganography. The techniques of hiding mes-
sages into images can be divided into Image 
Domain and Transform Domain[6]. The Im-
age Domain  (or spatial domain) techniques 
embed the message directly into the image, 
while the Transform domain the image  is 
first transformed and then  the message is 
embedinto the file. 
A digital image is represented as a collection 
of numbers that makeup different light inten-
sities in different areas ofthe image [7].  
The selection of the cover image is very im-
portant. It is advisable not to use well known 
images because the hidden message can be 
found very easily (please refer to section 4 
Methods of attack on Steganography, for 
more information about the attacks on Stega-
nography).  The best cover images are the 
ones with many details, which don’t have 
large portion with the same color. 
It must be clear that changing a bit in an im-
age might represent switching form a color 
pixel to another color one (like red to blue). 
Such a change will be immediately detected 
in the cover picture, imagine a red pixel in 
the middle of the sky. 
Another thing we must be aware when we se-
lect the cover image is the image compres-
sion and how the image is going to be trans-
mitted. There are two types of images com-
pression “lossless” and “lossy”. The differ-
ence between them is that “lossless” data 
compression is a type of algorithm that al-
lows the exact original data to be recon-
structed from the original data contrast to 
lossy algorithm which only allows an ap-
proximation of the original data to be recon-Informatica Economică vol. 15, no. 2/2011    155 
 
structed [8].The “jpeg” images uses  lossy-
compression while “bmp”,  ”giff” uses  the 
lossless compression.  
Due to the fact that the transmission medium 
for the Steganography is mostly the Internet, 
the preferred compression algorithm is the 
lossy compression because it offers bigger 
compression rates. 
The most common method of embedding in-
formation into an image is LSB algorithm 
(Least Significant Bit). The least significant 
bit (in other words, the 8th bit) of some or all 
of the bytes inside an image is changed to a 
bit of the secret message [9]. For example a 
grid for 3 pixels of a 24-bit image can be as 
follows: 
 
Fig. 1. Example of 3 pixels of a 24-bit image [9] 
 
If we embed the number 200, which has the 
11001000  binary representation,  using LSB 
techniques we obtain the following grid:  
 
Fig. 2. Example of 3 pixel with 200 number embedded [9] 
 
A practical example of Steganography is the  following image: 
 
 
Fig. 3. Example of image Steganography [10] 
 
The image above was used as an example, 
even if it contradicts what was stated earlier 
in this paper – not to use popular images, be-
cause the original can be found and then 
compared with the “fake” copy. As you can 
see there is no way you can detect by obser-
vation that there is something “wrong” with 
that picture.   
-  Steganography in Audio 
This type of steganography is very difficult 
because the human auditory system is per-
ceptible to background noises. The weakness 
of the human auditory system is that it can’t 
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low sounds. It is clear that this weakness 
must be exploited when hiding data into au-
dio files. 
There are several methods of data hiding in 
audio files: 
-  Low bit encoding which issomewhat 
similar to LSB that is generally used in 
Images.The problem with this technique 
is that the human ear can notice it. 
-  Spread Spectrum this method  addsran-
dom noises to the signal and the infor-
mation is concealed inside acarrier and 
spread across the frequency spectrum 
[11]. 
-  Echo data hiding this method uses the 
echoes in sound files in order to try and 
hide information [11]. 
If we hide information inside an image we 
risk damaging the file, the exact opposite 
happens in audio files. When information is 
inserted into an audio file sound can actually 
improve.    
-  Steganography in Video 
The most commonly used method for hiding 
information inside a video is DCT (Discrete 
Cosine Transform).  DCT works by slightly 
changing the each of the images in the video, 
only so much though so the human eye can’t 
notice  [12].  Steganography in Video works 
like the steganography in images, the differ-
ence is that the data is hidden in video 
frames. 
Westfeld and Wolf have described a method 
for data hiding in a videoconferencing sys-
tem[13]. Because of the bandwidth necessi-
ties the videoconference systems have a spe-
cial transmission system. Because of band-
width necessities the videoconferences sys-
tems transmit only the differences between 
successive frames. If the information is hid-
den when these differences are transmitted it 
is very hard to detect because there is no 
“whole” image to compare only frames dif-
ferences. 
-  Steganography in text 
There are several methods of hiding data into 
text or documents, sometimes called linguis-
tic Steganography. The most common me-
thods are: 
-  Open text methods like inter-sentence 
spacing, end of line spacing, inter-word 
spacing. The problem with these me-
thods is that they can be easily removed 
from the text by a simple reformatting. 
-  Syntactic method –  manipulates the 
punctuation to hide information. 
-  Semantic method –  this method uses 
synonyms for primary and secondary 
value.For example, the word "beautiful" 
could be considered primary and "exhi-
larating" secondary. Whether a word has 
primary or secondary value bears no re-
levance to how often it will be used, but 
primary words will be read as ones, sec-
ondary words as zeros when decoding 
[14]. 
-  New file generation – new files are gen-
erated in order to create the message.  
This latest method described is the best way 
to hide information inside documents be-
cause it doesn’t use o cover document, but 
rather creates one. A popular program that 
can do that is: spam mimic [15]. 
If we encode the following text “hidden mes-
sage” we obtain the following spam message: 
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Fig. 4. Example hidden message by generating a spam message 
 
We notice that the generated message is ac-
tually a “normal” spam message that mostly 
will be ignored. The advantage of this tech-
nique is that the generated spam can be send 
to millions of users and it will be quite im-
possible to know to whom that message was 
addressed. 
-  Steganography in networks 
Usually the Steganography in networks can 
be divided into the following categories [16]: 
-  Hiding in an attachment  -  is the basic 
form of sending Steganography files to 
another person. The message contains an 
attachment, a file, which has a secret 
message hidden inside it. The file can be 
an image, a audio file, video file, a doc-
ument. The best transmission methods 
are via email, ftp, website posting.  
-  Hiding in a transmission – it uses special 
programs that hide the data into a file 
and then transmit the message. The pre-
vious method needed two steps: first 
hide the data into the cover file, and then 
transmit the data. 
-  Hiding in  an overt protocol –  involves 
camouflaging  data like so it looks like 
something else. For example the data 
transmitted can be masked so it looks 
like normal web traffic, even though is 
not. 
-  Hiding in network headers – it uses the 
headers of the TCP/IP protocol to hide 
data. The IP protocol header contains the 
necessary information for packets to be 
routed where is needed, so when we in-
sert or change the data into the header 
we must do so we do not affect commu-
nication.
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Fig. 5. Example IP header 
 
Some fields in the IP header must contain 
specific values such: header length version 
number. If we change those numbers the 
communication will fail. One field in the IP 
header thatcan be changed without affecting 
the communication is the IP identification 
number. Usually this number is incremented 
by one when large packets are sent (the large 
packets are broken down into smaller one). A 
different number can be used as long as the 
order of the packages is respected and the 
protocol will work properly.  
 
4 Methods of attack on Steganography 
The most common attacks on Steganography 
are[5]: 
-  File only –an attacker must determine if 
the file in question contains a secret 
message hidden in it. Many of these ba-
sic attacks rely on statistical steganalysis 
(covered in section 5 of this article) to 
detect a possible hidden message in the 
file.  
-  File and Original copy – this is the case 
when the attacker is in possession of the 
original file and the file containing the 
secret message. In this case detecting the 
existence of a secret message is very 
easy, because the two files can be com-
pared. This is the reason that whenever 
Steganography is used it is recommend-
ed that the cover medium be an “original 
one” like: a picture taken with your own 
camera  etc. If this is not possible it is 
advisable to take the original cover (a 
picture, video, document etc) and alter it 
prior to information hiding. This way we 
ensure that there is no “original” file. 
-  Multiple encoded files – the attacker gets 
multiple files, same cover with different 
messages embedded into it. This might 
occur especially in watermarking a digi-
tal file with copyright information. Let’s 
assume that and attacker gets multiple 
copies of a book that contains different 
user information (each copy of the book 
has embedded information about the user 
who received the copy). In this case the 
simplest attack is to blend the files to-
gether and create a hybrid. 
-  Access to file and algorithm – if the at-
tacker has access to the file containing 
the secret message and algorithm used to 
hide the information; it might be easier 
to retrieve the hidden message. Some 
Steganography algorithms  safeguard 
against this method by using  the same 
principle as cryptography systems use: 
public and private keys –  without the 
private key it is impossible to retrieve 
the message. 
-  Destroy everything attack –this type of Informatica Economică vol. 15, no. 2/2011    159 
 
attack aims in destroying the message 
completely and the attacker might not 
even try to retrieve the message.  
-  Random tweaking attacks –adding small 
changes in the files hoping that the mes-
sage will be unreadable. As the previous 
form of attack the goal is to make the 
hidden message unreadable, not retriev-
ing it. 
-  Add New Information – in some cases 
the attackers  might use the same soft-
ware to hide a new message into the file. 
The original message might be overwrit-
ten. 
-  Reformat attack – a common way to de-
stroy the information hidden in a file is 
by changing the file format. This type of 
attack can produce a lot of damages to 
the hidden message. 
-  Compression attack – the attacker might 
compress the file which might result in 
the total loss of the secret message em-
bedded in the file, because the compres-
sion algorithms tend to remove extra in-
formation during compression. It is ob-
vious that “hidden message” equals extra 
information. 
From what stated above it is clear that if an 
attacker wants only to destroy the hidden 
message, he/she can do that very easily by 
combining some of the methods of attack 
presented above. 
 
5 Statistical analysis 
In order to analyze large quantities of images 
statistical analysis can be used. When we 
embed information into an image some sta-
tistical properties might deviate from the 
norm.  
For example embedding encrypted message 
into a GIF image changes the histogram of its 
color frequencies [17]. 
Figure belowpresents two images with a res-
olution of 640 ×480 in 24-bit color. The orig-
inal image was about 1.2 Mbytes, while the 
two JPEG images shown are  about 0.3 
Mbytes. Figure 6a is compressed original; 
Figure 6bcontains the  ﬁrst chapter of Lewis 
Carroll’s The Hunting of  the Snark. After 
compression, the chapter is about 15Kbytes. 
The human eye cannot detect which image 
holds  steganographic content  [18].
 
 
Fig. 6. Example of image that contains steganographic content [18] 
 
Even though the human eye can’t detect the 
message, the statistical analysis software can 
detect modification in the DCT coefficients. 
The DCT is used in JPEG image compres-
sion. 
JPEG divides the image into 8 by 8 pixel 
blocks, and then calculates the DCT of each 
block. The modification of a single DCT 
(while hiding the data) will affect all 64 im-
age pixels. 
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Fig. 7. Modification of DCT coefficients [18] 
 
The picture above shows the modification of 
DCT coefficients when a hidden message is 
inserted. 
To prevent detection by statistical tests the 
statistical properties of the cover medium 
must be preserved. To do that the user can 
estimate, prior to data hiding, the amount of 
data that can be hidden in an image while 
maintaining the correct statistics [19]. This 
way the “correct” image can be chosen – an 
image where the needed amount of data can 
be hidden “with the correct statistics”.  
 
6 Detection framework and results 
At the beginning at the article, it was men-
tioned that in order to prove or disprove the 
allegations that terrorists were using Stega-
nography to hide messages in images posted 
on eBay, Niels Provos and Peter Honeyman-
conducted an extensive Internet search where 
they analyzed over 2 million images and 
didn’t find a single hidden image[3]. 
This section presents the  Steganography 
software analyzed, the detection framework 
used for analyzing the images, the image se-
lection method and their results. 
The open source Steganographic  systems 
analyzed were:  
-  JStegis a program by Derek Upham 
which hides data in the ever popular JPG 
image format. Version 1.0 has a number 
of new improvements, including 40 bit 
RC4  encryption, determination of the 
amount of data a JPG can hide before-
hand, and user-selectable JPG options 
(ie. degree of compression). JSteg Shell 
is the interface for the JSteg program. 
-  JPHide is a program which hides a file 
in a jpeg visual image.The design objec-
tive was not simply to hide a file but ra-
ther to do this in such a way that it is im-
possible to prove that the host file con-
tains a hidden file. Given a typical visual 
image, a low insertion rate (under 5%) 
and the absence of the original file, it is 
not possible to conclude with any 
worthwhile certainty that the host file 
contains inserted data. As the insertion 
percentage increases the statistical nature 
of the jpeg coefficients differs from 
"normal" to the extent that it raises sus-
picion.[20]. 
-  OutGuessis a steganographic system 
available asUNIX source code. The last 
released version includes the ability to-
preserve statistical properties of the cov-
er image [21]. 
The proposed framework is StegDetect – a 
program developed by the authors which can 
detect content hidden with the above men-
tioned programs. 
Stegdetect is an automated tool for detecting 
steganographic content in images. It is capa-
ble of detecting several different stegano-
graphic methods to embed hidden informa-
tion in JPEG images. Currently, the detecta-
ble schemes are 
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-  jphide (unix and windows), 
-  invisible secrets, 
-  outguess 01.3b, 
-  F5 (header analysis), 
-  appendX and camouflage. 
The images for analysis were obtained from 
the eBay site (since that was the site in ques-
tion, which appeared in the newspapers re-
ports) and form a USENET archive. 
For obtaining the JPEG images form eBay a 
web crawler was needed.  Since at the mo-
ment  when  the study was conducted, there 
was no suitable web crawler available, one 
was written by the authors named “Crawl” 
The  Crawl web crawler starts a depth-first 
traversal of the web at the specified URLs. It 
stores all JPEG images that match the confi-
gured constraints [22]. 
Main features: 
-  Saves encountered images or other me-
dia types 
-  Media selection based on regular expres-
sions and size constraints 
-  Resume previous crawl after graceful 
termination 
-  Persistent database of visited URLs 
-  Very small and efficient code 
-  Asynchronous DNS lookups 
-  Supports robots.txt 
The web crawler was automatically inte-
grated with Stegdetect creating an automatic 
detection framework. 
Over two million images downloaded from 
eBay and over one million  from USENET 
discussion forums and failed to find a single 
genuine hidden message [3]. The conclusion 
of the study was obvious: the terrorists didn’t 
use steganography to communicate among 
them. 
This study divided the scientific community 
in two: some believed that the study was re-
levant and the result was proof enough others 
did not.  
 
7 Other studies 
Some of the people, who opposed the study 
conducted by NielsProvos and Peter Honey-
man, stated that Stegdetect is not an accurate 
tool to detect Steganography, because it was 
designed to detect hidden content created 
with open source software. Since the com-
mercial programs are more powerful and im-
plement “better”  algorithms, there was a 
chance that Stegdetect will not be able to 
detect content hidden with commercial pro-
grams. 
This assumption might be accurate, mainly if 
we take into consideration that commercial 
Steganography software is not that expensive 
and that large terrorist organizations are well 
funded. Not to mention thy can actually in-
vest in their own Steganography framework. 
So “Stegdetect” was “tested” against com-
mercial versions of steganography software 
[23].  
The following commercial software was eva-
luated: 
-  SecurEngine Professional  by AdrienPi-
net 
-  Computer security from Adolix 
-  Steganography from Secure Kit Incorpo-
rated 
The “Computer Security” software was used 
in the experiment due to its extensive list 
supported of cryptographic algorithms. 
The above software was used to create  an 
image with steganographic content. The im-
age was tested with StegDetect. The result of 
the test was negative; StegDetect wasn’t able 
to detect the hidden message created with a 
commercial on the shelf program. 
From the results of the experiment the fol-
lowing conclusions can be drawn: 
-  StegDetect can’t detect images using 
commercial software, in this case Com-
puter Security 
-  A better detection framework is needed 
in order to accurately detect hidden mes-
sages on the web 
-  Assure the integrity of the data files in 
order to certify  that they haven’t been 
modified  –  a legitimate  image was 
switched with one containing stegano-
graphic content 
-  Close monitoring of free web hosting 
servers, so they will not be used for post-
ing steganographic content. 
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8 Prevention methods 
It is clear that something must be done to 
prevent the use of Steganography. Authori-
ties have realized that and have started to in-
clude Steganalysis in the list of prevention 
measures to be taken against vicious persons 
using the Internet.  
The majority of the developed countries, EU, 
USA and other countries, alliances or secu-
rity structures are making intense efforts in 
order to identify, supervise, optimize and 
protect their vital critical infrastructures [24].  
For example the European Commission be-
gan to realize that classical security solutions 
are getting obsolete and that we must adapt 
to new trends – steganography being one of 
them. In order to counteract the European 
Commissionlaunched the Future Internet Ini-
tiative [25] as vital for economic growth in 
Europe. The initiative refers to the need to 
secure the Small Medium Enterprises (SME) 
against vicious uses of their resources – that 
being a huge security thereat. It is believed 
that governmental and large enterprises can 
protect their Internet resources, while the 
SMEs (including open source communities) 
can’t.  
The EU economy is based on SMEs, so it is 
clear that the SMEs must be protected against 
malicious uses of their resources.  
The major security challenges identified by 
the EU for SMEs can be broken into the fol-
lowing categories [26]: 
-  Access Control 
There is a growing need for monitoring solu-
tions (logs monitoring), smart passwords, lat-
est firewalls, updated computers. All of that 
will ensure that no one is misusing the re-
sources. A common tactic is to penetrate a 
network and use its resources outside the of-
fice hours – this type of attack can go unde-
tected for months. So the monitoring solu-
tions must take this practice and many more 
into consideration.  
-  Steganalysis 
Due to the increase necessity of large band-
widths for common business the SMEs are 
susceptible to steganography. Nowadays the 
email systems are not limited to a few mega-
bytes  per email, so a simple email can be 
used to sent multimedia files (such and im-
age, video, audio) to multiple persons. It is a 
common practice to receive “funny” messag-
es from friends and forward them to another 
list of friends. These “friendly” messages can 
contain steganographic content and can be 
used for corporate espionage even by terror-
ists. It is important to implement Steganaly-
sis tools as an internal LAN defense measure. 
-  Multi-tenancy 
Multi-tenancy is quite new concept that re-
fers to the architectural principle, where a 
single instance of the softwareruns on a soft-
ware-as-a-service (SaaS) vendor’s servers, 
serving multiple client organizations[26].The 
old concept implied the security of the appli-
cation by installing it into a controlled envi-
ronment, on a server in your own LAN. This 
tendency is starting to change as many com-
panies, especially SMEs, use SaaS. Some of 
the SMEs have renounced in having their 
own servers, some have even rented personal 
computers. 
 
9 Conclusions 
The use of Internet for communication is still 
open for debate. There are two groups in the 
scientific world: one agrees with fact that ter-
rorists are using steganography to communi-
cate with each other the other group does not. 
Nowadays there is sufficient evidence or lack 
of it to support both theories, but not enough 
to reach a definite conclusion. 
The most extended study on this topic was 
conducted by Niels  Provos and Peter Ho-
neyman where they analyzed over 2 million 
images  from eBay and one million from 
USENET archives  and didn’t find a single 
hidden image.  They used their own frame-
work to analyze the images.The framework 
was design to analyze hidden content created 
by the most popular steganography open 
source software at the time. 
Due to that fact, some people argued that the 
analysis framework was not effective and 
that commercial steganography software was 
more powerful. A study was made and it was 
proven that the steganographic framework 
used by Niels Provos and Peter Honeyman-
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steganography software. This represents a 
problem because possible terrorists groups 
have the capacity to buy commercial stega-
nographic software which is not that expen-
sive.  Another problem might be the images 
selection; possible terrorists might use popu-
lar web sites or might not – which will make 
the target images harder to find in order to be 
analyzed (we can’t scan the entire Internet). 
One thing is clear: the authorities have rea-
lized the security threat posed by steganogra-
phy and they began implementing measures 
and proposals to defend it.  The EU has rec-
ognized steganalysis as an important tool in 
the proposal made for by the Future Internet 
Initiative. The most important measure was 
implemented by the USA after the 9/11 ter-
rorists attacks by implementing the contro-
versial  Uniting and Strengthening America 
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 
known as the USA PATROT act, which al-
lows  the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) to search telephone, e-mail, and finan-
cial records of suspected terrorists without a 
court order. 
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